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Having begun from the assumption that our most fundamental way to relate to the world 
stems from an ‘I think’ and that consciousness is at the center of this act, Edmund Husserl sets 
himself up for a very narrow and specialized view of human experience. In the end, such 
assumptions in the philosophical tradition and their terms often remain unquestioned and 
ingrained in a paradigm of discourse. My aim is to move beneath these assumptions—using 
Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological work—so as to, first, explicitly undermine 
the scope of Husserlian intentionality at its foundation and, second, decenter the subject in 
contemporary phenomenological literature. An account of human experience in terms of inner 
intentional content, I argue, yields an incomplete and misleading picture of our human 
involvements and we must ultimately move beyond the subject and its logic. The way we are 
always already being-in-the-world and embodied in the phenomenal texture of everydayness 
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The task of bringing to light Dasein’s existential constitution leads first of all to 
the twofold task, intrinsically one, of interpreting more radically the phenomena 
of intentionality and transcendence.
1
 
The phenomenological given that consciousness is always consciousness of something, 
aptly termed intentionality, has elicited unprecedented attention from philosophers and scientists 
alike in the past century. Indeed, we often find an underlying theory of intentionality at the 
backbone of contemporary phenomenologically-based notions of self, agency and 
(inter)subjectivity with far ranging implications for current trends in the cognitive sciences and 
artificial intelligence. In these discussions, Edmund Husserl—known as father of 
phenomenology—remains a key figure, often providing not only the common language but the 
very approach for us to begin addressing the topic. “Zu den Sachen selbst,”2 as goes his famous 
motto, captures the spirit of the task at hand:  What does this ‘stretching out’ (In-tendere) of 
consciousness entail?  How are we to understand the essence (eidos) of things as (re)presented in 
consciousness? How are we to make sense of the constituting act of this aboutness? These are 
difficult questions but Husserl didn’t lack a starting groundwork whence to begin. With Kant’s 
transcendental method and the cogito as a point of departure—albeit sharply rejecting Descartes’ 
inference (i.e., ergo sum)—Husserl advanced an investigation of what has to be presupposed by 
this unique characteristic of consciousness as conditions for its possibility. To this purpose, it is 
certainly difficult to imagine a more adequate theoretical origin than our basic and seemingly 
                                                            
1 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 162. 




obvious understanding of ourselves as an ‘I think’ from which the momentous Cartesian 
paradigm stemmed. 
 Husserl’s unique approach, however, unlike that of Kant or Descartes, involved a direct 
observation of one’s own experience—the purpose of which was to give an account of the 
underlying structures of consciousness that make (re)presentation of an object possible. His 
method espoused a distinctly reductive process, called the phenomenological reduction, through 
which one ‘brackets out’ any natural, causal and metaphysical assumptions about the things of 
our experience (in the epoché) in order to get at their essence as intentional objects (via the 
eidetic reduction) given to consciousness. This process specifically demands that we start with 
the phenomena and suspend our biases and pre-suppositions that grant us the world as it appears. 
The resulting corpus in phenomenology is fascinating, and it is widely regarded as his greatest 
contribution to philosophy. As we will explore, Husserl’s attempt to detail a phenomenological 
account of the way we, as subjects, relate to the world (i.e., of the intentional structures that must 
be in place to make this ‘aboutness’ possible) is a task with much philosophical relevance and 
discussion. More significantly, by proposing the conditions of our being able to encounter 
anything in experience, Husserl may not only have been attempting an account of the intentional 
object-constitution in and of consciousness but also, as a consequence, of the 
(phenomenological) foundation of our coming to knowledge. 
Objective, Critique Background and Key Questions 
My effort through this paper is primarily deconstructive; thematically, it is informed by 
ontology and phenomenology and I employ world-disclosing arguments to advance my case 
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against the subject-originated intentionality Husserl proposes. For the purposes of this critique, I 
don’t attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of Husserl’s work on intentionality or the 
significant revisions he advanced—as such an endeavor is well beyond the scope of this paper—
but rather I place emphasis on the groundwork and assumptions of his concepts in order to 
destabilize his theory at its foundation. I will focus on Husserl’s theory of intentionality, internal 
time consciousness and transcendental ego in order to, preliminarily, criticize the basic 
assumptions underlying his transcendental move and, consequently, delimit the scope of the 
intentional structure he proposes to a very narrow and specialized aspect of human experience. 
The kind of enduring presence that Husserl espouses, as I will argue, is not enough a basis on 
which to understand the more holistic, embodied and concrete nuances of our everyday 
experience. In setting up this background for the traditional view of intentionality, I rely on 
Husserl’s foundational work exemplified in his Cartesian Meditations, Ideas I and Logical 
Investigations. Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of the hyle and noetic schema, Derrida’s undermining 
of the Augenblick and Gurwitsch’s attack on the transcendental ego, serve as central support for 
this preliminary effort. I will then contend that Husserlian intentionality is not only significantly 
flawed, but that it ultimately provides for a misleading picture of human directedness. 
Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger launched powerful critiques and a contrasting account of 
intentionality and the role of consciousness (its ‘intentional object-apprehension’) in experience. 
It is here, in the second chapter of this paper, that my reading of their phenomenological work 
helps me further undermine Husserl’s theory—which I will refer to as traditional intentionality—
and his assumptions rooted in Descartes’ and Kant’s work. In the first place, I will show that 
Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger place more adequate emphasis in the on-going and unhindered 
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experience of our involvements, so as to preserve the phenomena and what it reveals, without 
bracketing or subjecting it to a transcendental reduction. Phenomena, as we will see in this view, 
are not mere appearances to be purified (in an eidetic reduction) but are rather always already 
rich with meaning that one cannot do without lest one does away with their significance 
completely. In my reading of Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s work, their (existential) 
phenomenology rejects not only this transcendental thrust but disallows the very logic of the 
Cartesian dichotomy (i.e., of subjects and objects) and the ‘cogito’ that, as we will see, Husserl 
grants from the outset. 
Martin Heidegger, Husserl’s most renowned student, was perhaps also his strongest 
critic. Yet, he remains arguably amongst the most easily dismissed thinkers of our time. Such 
seemingly empty qualification may, indeed, implicate his inexcusable past political affiliations. I 
will not venture any conjecture on the matter here. However, we can suspect that this historical 
fact itself may have been what was most censorious to readings of his work—and understandably 
so. This simply can be no longer and I believe we must, in the spirit of philosophical inquiry, 
read his work for its own worth. In order thus to understand the scope of Heidegger’s critique 
and its consequence to Husserl, I must then begin where Heidegger began—in ontology. All 
derivative claims about intentionality and subjectivity may certainly be misunderstood, at best, if 
we do not grasp the ontic-ontological distinctions that are presupposed by them. The first 
division of Heidegger’s magnum opus, Being and Time, is dedicated to just this topic and is a 
principal source in my analysis and arguments.  
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The ontological quest for Heidegger revolves around the concept of being, which he 
initiates through a Seinsfrage (i.e., question of being). This investigation, as I shall clarify, must 
also be necessarily grounded in the (concrete) phenomena of our experience. But how and why is 
being studied phenomenologically? In what ways does being manifest itself in our experience 
and what is our relation to this concept? How do Heidegger’s ontological considerations 
undermine Husserlian intentionality, specifically? Answers to questions such as these, while 
exegetically based, guide my arguments and provide a background necessary for the ultimately 
positive task at hand. More importantly, Heidegger began from the analytic of Dasein (and its 
existence) which, only through careful consideration of his revolutionary ontology, can displace 
and de-center the cogito and its subjectivity. An understanding of what our being-in-the-world 
means, as I will demonstrate, invalidates the emptiness from which Husserl’s transcendental 
subject (or ego) constitutes its objects’ meaning/sense (Sinn). Lastly, Heidegger’s analysis of 
worldhood is absolutely crucial to the deconstruction—and note that here I use the term in the 
original Heideggerean sense (Abbau)—of the modern picture (of subjects relating to objects) in 
the third chapter. 
In the Husserlian discussion of intentionality, additionally, the body occupies quite an 
anomalous position. Indeed, a theory of intentionality that presupposes the very distinction of 
subjects and objects has trouble identifying something which is neither within the inner 
subjective (immanent) sphere of consciousness nor fully extended as an (transcendent) object 
one can apprehend outside of it. Our bodies, notwithstanding the tradition’s neglect (and which 
still finds its way in Husserl’s work), are of central importance in re-thinking intentionality. One 
does well to note that even Heidegger made no mention of the body. In light of this, I aim to 
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explain why the body cannot be relegated to a marginal or anomalous position in Heidegger’s 
ontology. As we will see, it is absurd to claim that Heidegger ‘brackets’ the body or that he falls 
under the traditional neglect of it. Such conclusions are often characteristic of a poor reading or 
disregard for Division I in the existential analytic of Dasein (Being and Time). 
Merleau-Ponty’s work on the body is therefore of central relevance. Having been 
strongly influenced by both Husserl and Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty’s main concern was a 
phenomenologically based account of embodiment and perception. Where Heidegger was unable 
to expound on the role of the body in intentionality, one finds a complementary and thorough 
account in his Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty has much more in common with 
Heidegger than with Husserl here and this relationship will come into better view in the first and 
second chapters. Through their work, they were subverting what Husserl granted from the 
tradition and proposing not only a more basic account of intentionality but a revolutionary 
understanding of what it means to be the being that we are. How is the body constituted in 
intentionality? What place does it occupy and how does it differ from the intentional object-
apprehension of consciousness?  Answers to these questions provide the necessary support in 
rethinking intentionality beneath the scope of the subject and beyond its own limitations. 
Merleau-Ponty’s insight into perception and his notion of body schema directly undermine 
Husserl’s account of the intentional object-constitution (qua sense-impression). As we will see, 
the body schema provides an excellent alternative in considering embodied intentionality. 
The overarching thesis questions I address are as follows:  In so far as Husserl’s theory of 
intentionality is still rooted in traditional assumptions, how does Merleau-Ponty’s and 
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Heidegger’s work undermine his view and, subsequently, how do they leave the prejudices of the 
tradition behind? What do they propose in lieu of this intentionality and how does the traditional 
view stand in relation to it? Finally, how can we interpret their findings so as to de-center the 
subject in contemporary phenomenological discourse and propose a more fundamental way of 
relating to the world? I want to discuss, more broadly, why an account of human experience in 
terms of a inner intentional content is misleading, what such mental content has to presuppose in 
the first place, and, consequently, why the cogito itself must be ‘transcended’—not to another 









THE TRADITIONAL VIEW:  HUSSERL AND TRANSCENDENTAL 
PRESENCE 
The philosophical paradigm articulated and granted by Husserl’s time puts an inner, self-
contained subject at the center of experience.
3
 We are subjects relating to objects, a thinking 
thing (res cogitans), essentially. Transcendence, in this discussion, is that by which we are able 
to reach out, as it were, to the world out there from within—the conditions for its possibility. 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology emerges out of these very fundamental notions. Indeed, 
in his magnum opus, Logical Investigations, he articulates this view by postulating that it is 
foremost by virtue of our directed content that we have access to the things out in the world. In 
turn, this intentional content, characteristic in and of consciousness through mental acts (or 
cogitations), is the phenomenological foundation of our coming to knowledge of anything, in so 
far as we are able to grasp any object (tangible or otherwise, possible or impossible). He explains 
thus in the 5
th
 investigation: 
Content must mean experience, a real part of consciousness . . . To refer to the 
world may be an experience, but the world itself is the object intended . . . It 
makes no difference what sort of being we give our object, or with what sense or 
justification we do so. . . the act remains ‘directed upon’ its object. If one asks 
how something non-existent or transcendent can be the intentional object in an act 
in which it has no being, one can give the answer we gave above . . . The object is 
an intentional object: this means there is an act having a determinate intention. 
This ‘reference to an object’ belongs peculiarly and intrinsically to an act-




                                                            
3 This qualification is not meant as a sweeping historical generalization. While one often finds little agreement in any one epoch 
of philosophical discourse, there is often a common ground (or set of assumptions) guiding what is considered relevant to ask, 
important to answer, etc. This is a paradigm’s framework. 
4 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Investigation V (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1970), §14, 568; §20, 587. 
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 Likewise, Husserl qualifies the status of an act in relation to its object and 
experience the following way: 
Each act has its own appropriate, intentional, objective reference . . . Whatever the 
composition of an act . . . if it is an act at all, it must have a single objective 
correlate, to which we say it is ‘directed,’ in the full, primary sense of the world . . 




 That this intentional content, in and of consciousness, mediates our contact with the 
world could therefore be considered part of the definition for what it means to be a subject in its 
relating to an object. 
For Husserl, the intentional nature of consciousness is expressed, specifically, in the 
relation of a noetic act or noesis (νοῦς for “mind”) to the noema that belongs to any intentional 
object thus constituted.
6
 ‘Thinghood’ (of the object as experienced) is therefore given to us in 
such a way so as to present its sense/meaning (Sinn) through a noematic correlate and from an 
originating mental process (e.g., remembrance, imagination, perception, etc).
7
 While there are 
different interpretations about the relation between the object-as-intended and the object-that-is-
                                                            
5 Ibid., §17, 579; §41, 648. 
6 Particularly, Husserl writes: “Corresponding in every case to the multiplicity of Data pertaining to the really inherent noetic 
content, there is a multiplicity of Data . . . in a correlative ‘noematic content’ or, in short, in the ‘noema’.”  Edmund Husserl, 
Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1982), § 88, 213 -214. 
7 Husserl further notes: 
 
Perception, for example, has its noema, most basically its perceptual sense, i.e., the perceived as perceived. 
Similarly the current case of remembering has its remembered as remembered , just as its <remembered>, 
precisely as it is “meant,” “intended to” in <the remembering>; again, the judging has the judged as judged, 
liking has the liked as liked, and so forth. In every case the noematic correlate which is called “sense” here . . 
. is to be taken precisely as it inheres “immanently” in the mental process of perceiving, of judging, of liking . 
. . that is, just as it is offered to us when we inquire purely into this mental process itself”. 
 
Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, § 88, 214. 
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intended, the noema simply constitutes the intentional object as experienced.
8
 Let us take an 
example and briefly consider the experience of perceiving a pencil. 
The pencil on the desk in front of me, from a Husserlian line of analysis, is apprehended 
by my act of perceiving it (in noesis) that constitutes its meaning (through the noema) as such, as 
something with particular and general properties and about which I may form beliefs from my 
perceptual orientation that are distinct from the actual (transcendent) object but shaped by it.
9
 
The originating mental structure prescribes the meaning of the object as experienced and thus 
constitutes the intentional object in consciousness. I can imagine a pencil and, in the act of 
imagination, likewise, the object is thereby constituted as imagined. 
The intentional object, furthermore, gets its material content in a noetic substructure 
where Husserl introduces the hyle. Coming from the Greek ὕλη for ‘matter,’ it is what he claims 
must come into the intentional structure to account for the formation of the noema and on the 
basis of which the object gets its meaning as part of the subjective experience. As Husserl 
explains: 
We find such concrete really immanental Data [data of color, data of tone, data of 
smell, etc] as components in more inclusive concrete mental processes which are 
intentive as wholes; and, more particularly, we find those sensuous moments 
overlaid by a stratum which, as it were, “animates,” which bestows sense . . . a 




                                                            
8 Whether the noema is a representational/propositional entity or a perspectival aspect of experience that is self-transcending, it is 
enough to see, for our purposes, that intentional content is by definition self-sufficient. 
9 This has to do with Husserl’s distinction of the object of experience as ‘real’ and the object as experienced (or intentional 
object) as ‘ireal.’ 
10 Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, 203. 
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Hyletic content, however, “has in itself nothing pertaining to intentionality.”11 As such, 
the hyle are the meaningless, non-intentional, raw bits that get animated/interpreted in noetic 
apprehension and pulled into consciousness to give thinghood presence. They are the analogous 
building blocks, so to speak, that along with the animating process of the noetic schema provide 
the operative and necessary conditions for the meaning-constitution (noema) and (re)presentation 
of an intentional object in consciousness.  
Returning to the earlier example, the pencil becomes an intentional object because of 
perceived qualities, as having an elongated and rigid shape with a pointed end distinct from its 
surroundings and other objects, that, more specifically, are determined by basic constitutive 
experiences of form, shape and color underlying it, but that are also completely unrelated to its 
intentional character as said object. These basic subjective qualities that enter my consciousness 
as raw data “present themselves as material for intentional formings or sense-bestowings at 
different levels” to my perception of the intentional object.12  But they also exist independently 
of and indifferently to it. This is simply to say that neither the experience of the color yellow nor 
the experience of the shape of an elongated object in itself qualifies the pencil as an intentional 
object, but it is a necessary part in constituting my experience of it. 
We can then ask:  How is the object constituted in time and what is the status of the hyle 
in the temporal stretching of experience? Husserl was so thorough that he also proposed a 
breakthrough theory of internal time-consciousness to address these very questions. The instant 
of apprehension, where the noema is constituted in hyletic interpretation, is at the dead center of 
                                                            
11 Ibid. 
12 Cited in Shaun Gallagher, The Inordinance of Time (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 44. 
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the intentional structure:  the ‘now’.  Indeed, here is how Husserl explains it analogously to 
perception of a tone in music. 
The “source-point” with which the production of the enduring object begins is a 
primal impression. This consciousness is in a state of constant change: the tone-
now present “in person” continuously changes . . . into something that has been. 
But when consciousness of the tone-now, the primal impression, passes over into 
retention, this retention itself is a now in turn, something actually existing. Every 
actually present now of consciousness . . .  it changes into retention of retention 
and does so continuously . . . Every process that constitutes its object originally is 
animated by protentions that emptily constitute what is coming as coming, that 
catch it and bring it towards fulfillment.
 13
 
The animation of the hyle by the noetic schema, or primal impression, thus stretches out 
into the flow of experience temporally via a retentional continuum that keeps hold of the 
intentional object and a protentional function anticipating an immediate but indeterminate ‘just 
to-come.’ Presentation (perception) of an object in consciousness is constituted only within the 
limits between retention and protention by the phasing of primal impressions while re-
presentation (non-perception) lies behind it as recollection of that which is no longer present but 
already past. An immediate future is pre-constituted in primal expectation after the protentional 
function but has in itself no content or status. 
The now, or the source point, is the point of constitution for an intentional object and 
locus of temporal experience. Because of its role in the object-constitution, additionally, Husserl 
seems to designate the hyle as what is ultimately real in this transcendent structure of 
consciousness. It is, after all, that by virtue of which an intentional object comes to presence and 
gains cadence along the temporal continuum. The source point, too, appears to be the temporal 
                                                            
13 Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917) (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1991), §11, 24. 
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center in which the only moment of real presence occurs. As Gallagher explains, “since 
retentioning functions in an intentional way, what remains present in consciousness. . . is not just 
the past-note itself, or the memory-image, or the sensation of the just-past note. Rather the only 
thing that is really (reell) present is delivered by the current primal impression.”14 Indeed, even 
in retentioning we have a certain non-presence that, while still within the bounds of perception, 
is itself not real and already past the blink of an eye (Augenblick). Protention and retention are 
thus characteristic of the non-presence that is still part of perception to the integration of primal 
nows in experience. Here, Merleau-Ponty offers perhaps the clearest explanation of this 
phenomenon of temporality: 
Husserl uses the terms protentions and retentions for the intentionalities which 
anchor me to an environment. They do not run from a central I, but from my 
perceptual field itself, so to speak, which draws along in its wake its own horizon 
of retentions, and bites into the future with its protentions. I do not pass through a 
series of instances of now, the images of which I preserve and which, placed end 
to end, make a line. With the arrival of every moment, its predecessor undergoes a 
change: I still have it in hand and it is still there, but already it is sinking away 
below the level of presents; in order to retain it, I need to reach through a thin 
layer of time. It is still the preceding moment, and I have the power to rejoin it as 
it was just now; I am not cut off from it, but still it would not belong to the past 
unless something had altered, unless it were beginning to outline itself against, or 
project itself upon, my present, whereas a moment ago it was my present. When a 
third moment arrives, the second undergoes a new modification; from being a 




Certainly, temporal constitution of an object in consciousness is characterized by this 
‘width of presence’ that provides us a unified immediate experience, always stretching out 
beyond and beneath itself. As Dan Zahavi puts it, “we can perceive temporal objects because 
                                                            
14 Gallagher, The Inordinance of Time, 51. 
15 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge, 2002), 483-484. 
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consciousness is not caught in the now. We do not merely perceive the now-phase . . . but also its 
past and future phases.”16 But what gives the subject its characteristic unity of apprehensions to 
an object? To answer this question, the father of phenomenology proposes yet another 
transcendentally purified entity:  the (transcendental) ego. Since consciousness is always 
consciousness-of-something, it must also be consciousness-of-itself. Evidently, as Husserl 
claims, “the ego is existent for himself in continuous evidence; thus, in himself, he is 
continuously constituting himself as existing.”17 With this reflective move, Husserl unveils the 
ego as the origin of all intentional acts. It is what endures in consciousness as their source and 
reaches through them, as it were, towards the intentional object. A double polarization can then 
also be seen in these acts of consciousness:  one towards the intentional object and the other 
towards the transcendental ego. “We encounter [this] second polarization. . . which embraces all 
the particular multiplicities of cogitationes collectively and in its own manner, namely as 
belonging to the Ego, who, as the active and affected subject of consciousness, lives in all 
processes of consciousness and is related, through them, to all object poles.”18 Therefore, in 
Husserl’s view, we conceive of the ego as the overseer to which every mental act always points 
and in which it is always a reflection of itself. 
Critiques of the Husserlian Picture 
Out of his own phenomenological work, Merleau-Ponty offers a powerful criticism of 
Husserl’s concept of hyle and noetic schema. He argues that one just cannot find any such 
detachable bits to experience which aren’t already correlated with and inter-defined by being in a 
                                                            
16 Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 82. 
17 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1999), §31, 66. 
18 See ibid. 
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whole of other sensations and shared significations and, as a result, there is no such (noetic) 
apprehension of a raw thing the “office of which is to give significance to a matter that has 
none.”19 Rather, perceptual experience seems a unity from the start. Parts of our experience can 
certainly be derived from it but, when we look at our experiences, these qualities are not self-
sufficient—much less meaningless—and they can’t make up the whole. The wooly redness of a 
carpet, to take a phenomenological example, is different than the shiny redness of a fire engine 
even though these colors could match the same color strip of red because properties are not 
independent of one another, but they are holistically related in perception.
20
  
Indeed, coming back to the example of encountering a pencil, the intentional object 
appears constituted as a pencil not because a barrage of unrelated and independent characteristics 
in a phenomenal background get somehow selectively interpreted (i.e., apprehended in the noetic 
schema) but, rather, because I can already perceive the pencil as a meaningful whole of itself, 
distinct to everything else around it (unified objects and spaces) and because of the relational 
meaning it already has as a pencil.
21
 When I examine this experience without subjecting to a 
reduction, there are not any meaningless hyle to be found nor is there some ghostly inner entity 
which is then charged with the bestowing of meaning. Rather we begin with a meaningful but 
not fully determined whole in the perceptual field. Simply put, the simplest ‘sense-given’ 
commonly available to us is itself already pregnant with meaning. Hyletic experiences thus 
seem, by this reasoning, unparsimonious and a contradiction of terms—abstractions with no 
                                                            
19 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 471. 
20 Hubert Dreyfus often provides this useful example in his Merleau-Ponty courses at U.C. Berkeley. 
21 This point leads to our ontological discussion of Heidegger’s notion of ‘ready-to-hand’ in the following chapter. 
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meaning or content only found when you objectify and reduce perceptual experience and that 
invite significantly more questions than answers. 
Derrida also offers a similar critique of Husserl’s internal time structure. As we have 
seen, Husserlian temporality depends upon the source point, the now, from which the now-
apprehension is, as it were, “the nucleus of a comet’s tail of retentions.”22 It is in there, in the 
Augenblick (i.e., in the moment of primal impression), that real presence is encountered while 
everything that is retentively apprehended is merely a perceiving of that which is already just 
past—an unreal present, as it were, still within the bounds of temporal perception. The 
introductory challenge Derrida raises is with regards to how the givenness of temporal objects 
merely passes over between perception and non-perception. 
One sees quickly that the presence of the perceived present can appear as such 
only inasmuch as it is continuously compounded with a nonpresence and 
nonperception, with primary memory and expectation (retention and protention) . 
. . Husserl resolutely maintains that there is “no mention here of a continuous 
accommodation of perception to its opposite.”23  
Would not such temporal re-constitution be phenomenologically important?
24
 Moreover, 
how can there be such a relationship without undermining the Augenblick, that is, without 
admitting a continuity or phasing between the now and not-now? Wouldn’t such compromise, 
more importantly, by its undermining of the central role of primal impression, make presentation 
and re-presentation unintelligible, at best? At worst, impossible? 
                                                            
22 Cited in Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1973), 62. 
23 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, 64-65. 
24 Isn’t this how we go ‘to things themselves’? 
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As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now . . . we admit the 
other into the self-identity of the Augenblick; nonpresence and nonevidence are 
admitted into the blink of the instant . . . This alterity is in fact the condition for 
presence . . . it radically destroys any possibility of a simple self-identity . . . The 
fact that nonpresence and otherness are internal to presence strikes at the very root 
of the argument for the uselessness of signs in the self-relation.
25
 
Derrida astutely contends that perhaps this “abyss [between] retention and 
representation,” their relation, is “none other than the history of life and of life becoming 
conscious”—that the common root in them is not a possibility which inhabits the Augenblick but 
already “constitutes it from the very movement of difference it introduces.”26 Presence lies in 
differentiation, succinctly put, and the now-apprehension can gain self-presence only through the 
retentional folding-back of consciousness. A fortiori, this trace is more primordial both 
conceptually and phenomenologically. We can turn to the phenomenon encountered here. Is not 
this now, in which you (the reader) read these words on paper or a digital screen, already pre-
constituted not just retentively, as you grasp each iteration of letters and words henceforth and 
retain their immediate significance, but even representatively, as you make sense of whole 
sentences and ideas in relation to this word and, more broadly, in a temporally guided activity of 
reading? Indeed, the realization of the importance of this temporal function undermines the 
centrality of the concept of primal impression. We must always check our experience in the 
practice of phenomenology. Moreover, isn’t a mere succession of nows rather derivative from a 
more pervasive temporal horizon? Notably, in Husserl’s Phenomenology, Zahavi points out that 
“we always anticipate that which is about to happen . . . [because] we always have a horizon of 
anticipation.”27 It is well known that Husserl’s later work even turns towards a ‘genetic 
                                                            
25 Ibid., 65-66. 
26 Ibid., 67. 
27 Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology, 83. 
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phenomenology’ in which he considers how past experiences and acquired knowledge inform 
immediate experiences but, still, “it is true that Husserl [assigns] a privileged status to 
intuition.”28 This is made evident by the central role he gives to the concept of the hyle and the 
Augenblick in his quest to the intentional object. To no surprise, what we find at the heart of 
presence in Husserl’s temporality is an abyssal emptiness—an absence that the meaning 
bestowing process (or noetic schema) must fill endlessly. 
What can then be said about the overseer of all intentional acts? Aron Gurwitsch, another 
renowned phenomenologist, raises some important charges against Husserl’s concept of 
transcendental ego. He argues that the ego is the byproduct of reflection, the theoretical result of 
reflecting on your intentional content, and further that “the unity of consciousness in no way 
depends upon the ego; [rather] the latter is rendered possible by the former.”29 This turn of terms 
is significant because it lets us see the ego not as the prima facie cause of conscious acts but 
rather as the consequence of their reflection. 
Reflection gives rise to a new object—the ego—which appears only if this 
attitude is adopted. Since the grasping act is not itself grasped, the act continues 
having no egological structure. It deals with the ego as an object only; and it finds 
this object connected with its proper object, viz., the grasped act upon which it 
bears. Hence the ego in question is that of the grasped, not of the grasping act.
30
 
Indeed, in any mode of pre-reflective act that belongs to our concrete experiences we just 
do not find such an abstract construct. Take the clear case of emotions and any practical dealings 
wherein we perceive some guiding feature deposited into a situation—truly, constitutive of it—
                                                            
28 This is because, as Zahavi points out, “the more immediate the object shows itself for the subject, the more it is present. And 
the more present it is, the more real it is.” Consequently, this seems also to align Husserl with a metaphysics of presence as we 
describe in the following chapter. Zahavi rejects this connection. See Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology, 94-95. 
29 Aaron Gurwitsch, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 324. 
30 Ibid., 327. 
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that does not require any such ego directing or mirroring. There is no cognizing or checking 
upon myself to be done, no self-reflection shooting to and from my conscious acts as I follow 
through with my actions, manipulating objects and immersed in situations. There is simply a-
friend-in-need or my-lover-lain-before-me pulling me thus.
31
 This meaning is deposited in 
objects and situations so that one does not need some ultimate overseer of intention to coordinate 
what is already salient in the concrete experience. The transcendental ego is useless. 
The Body 
Evidently, Husserlian intentionality assumes certain philosophical distinctions that situate 
our understanding of ourselves in the modern discourse of subjects relating to objects. There is a 
rigid categorical distinction at its foundation, as we have seen, between what is inner and 
belonging to the realm of consciousness and mental acts and what is outer as transcendent 
objects that we apprehend via our intentional content. This framework leaves a rather awkward 
place for the body, since it belongs to neither category. Considered phenomenologically, it blurs 
(and verily erases) the lines that qualify these as distinct realms of experience. Taylor Carman 
summarizes the struggle to conceptualize the body under this logic thus: 
Husserl . . .  resorts to describing [the body] as “a thing ‘inserted’ between the rest 
of the material world and the ‘subjective’ sphere”. . . Yet the body is precisely 
what orients us in a world in which we are able to individuate subjects and objects 
to begin with. Nor does having a body consist in having either abstract thoughts 
about a body or concrete sensations localizable in a body, since embodiment is 
what makes possible the very ascription of thoughts and sensations to subjects.
32
 
                                                            
31 See ibid., 321 for more examples. 
32 Taylor Carman, “The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty,” Philosophical Topics 27 (Fall 1999), 206. 
20 
 
Such neglect of the body is not at all surprising. If the foundation of our theory of 
intentionality is the Cartesian ‘I think’ (i.e., the cogito) and the dualism inherent in assuming a 
primordial disconnect between (inner) mental and (outer) material, nothing could be more 
theoretically anomalous than a non-mental but intentional ‘thing.’ “It is precisely this conceptual 
dualism,” Carman points out, “that prevents Husserl from acknowledging the body as the 
original locus of intentional phenomena in perceptual experience.”33 Indeed, considering 
Husserl’s treatment of ‘inter-subjectivity’, Ted Toadvine also recognizes that “Merleau-Ponty 
finds Husserl unable to account for the experience of others due to the Cartesian conception of 
the cogito to which he remains committed . . . of the indubitable cogito.”34 The body remains a 
strange object with no defined place in Husserl’s ontology of mind (mental acts) and its things 
(intentional objects) and his theory of intentionality, granting this dualist space at the outset, 
appears to rearticulate the prejudices of modern philosophy.  
Returning to Merleau-Ponty, we find in his account of motor intentionality one of the 
clearest alternatives to Husserl’s mental model. Indeed, by more directly turning to the body in 
his work, Phenomenology of Perception, he demonstrated that an intentionality of mere mental 
acts fails to account for our bodily grasp in habitual worldly experience.
35
 Instead, “it is the body 
which understands;” “The body is our general medium for having a world.”36 In the everyday 
setting itself ahead, towards things and through them for some purpose—which need not be 
mental nor conscious—our body is in constant grasp of its world; we’re always already given 
                                                            
33 Ibid., 209. 
34 Ted Toadvine, “Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl: A Chronological Overview,” in Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 250. 
35 We will see just what this means in the following chapter through a discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of body schema. 
36 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 169, 167. 
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within it (etre au monde) in an embodied activity. This bodily intentionality permeates our 
involvements more fundamentally, in the ongoing grasp of a motor significance, than the object 
apprehension by noetic acts Husserl postulated—truly, it does not necessitate any such 
(re)presentation. Here it is important to acknowledge, however, that current phenomenological 
literature aligns Merleau-Ponty close to Husserl, in light of Husserl’s later work and his 




Against the Subject: Initial Claims 
While these few but central critiques are but some of those launched in response to 
Husserl’s theory, his contemporary influence is undisputed. Revisions and re-considerations of 
his ideas might be just as numerous and, perhaps, of even more consequence (e.g., to current 
projects in developing a phenomenologically informed cognitive science).
38
 Based on these 
objections and how I interpret them, we can now articulate a series of claims, however, so as to 
show how they undermine traditional intentionality, specifically, and the logic of the cogito, 
generally. 
From my earlier reading of Merleau-Ponty and his argument of perceptual holism, I 
claim, firstly, that the hyle and noetic schema are neither self-sufficient nor necessary to the 
intentional object apprehension. Certainly, this kind of (transcendental) atomism of the input is 
                                                            
37 See Toadvine, “Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl: A Chronological Overview,” 227-286. Also, see Zahavi, “Merleau-Ponty 
on Husserl: A Reappraisal” in Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl, 3-29. Notably, in Husserl’s Phenomenology, Zahavi presents 
excellent support for this connection. 
38 Exemplary to this is also Shaun Gallagher’s work in radical embodiment, particularly in How the Body Shapes the Mind, that is 
informed by Merleau-Ponty’s and Husserl’s work. 
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undermined by the very realization of the holistic character of our experiences 
phenomenologically. An object constituted in our phenomenal field, for example, is always first 
a whole and pregnant with meaning such that even when we try to break it into its most basic 
parts (or bits) they always bear on each other and are each defined by the very interrelation 
which constrains them in and of that object.
39
 This perceptual unity is more basic to our 
experience. Moreover, by acknowledging a meaningfulness of the bits, which may be derived in 
relation to the whole, we avoid the conceptual necessity of conjuring a meaning-bestowing 
process. 
As concerns temporality, secondly, I argue that the now (as primal impression) appears a 
dubious source of presence in the temporal constitution of meaning. Because presence itself 
consists in differentiation, as we have already considered, the meaning of each now cannot itself 
be wholly and primarily constituted in the Augenblick. It is, indeed, in the retentional trace (and 
protention function) that we find a more significant precursor. This is not at all to say that the 
now has no place in this continuum; it is simply to state that Husserl’s Augenblick is grossly 
over-determined in what it can constitute temporally. It is not unreasonable to suppose, for 
example, that a meaning-giving activity actually prescribes how each now is interpreted into a 
temporal continuum. 
Thirdly, I contest that the transcendental ego is a deficient explanation for the unity of our 
concrete experiences. In our daily dealing with objects and situations, the transcendental ego not 
only seems missing, as Gurwitsch demonstrates, but is also crippled by the very fact that it 
                                                            
39 If we look, for example, at an image of a duck that also looks like a rabbit we realize how difficult it is to isolate parts of the 
drawing so as to construct one image without the perspective of the other also impinging on our perception. For an additional and 
relevant discussion of the Müller-Lyer illusion see Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 6. 
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necessitates a (re)presentation of the intentional object as given to consciousness (i.e., through 
serial mental acts.) Further, in so far as it is the polar source of intentional acts, the 
transcendental ego seems to censor the very possibility of any behavior that it cannot oversee. By 
contrast, our already-being-given-in-the-world, wherein we do not have to cognize or represent 
an object of intention to carry out an action, is an integral part of our everyday directedness (i.e., 
the day to day) and is a capacity that Husserl’s transcendental ego simply cannot capture. It 
cannot so much as get us out of the door without (re)presentation of the doorknob. The ego is the 
source of all acts, in Husserl’s picture, but it seems to be incapable of action. 
Finally, I believe Husserl’s theory of intentionality is still subject to the charge of 
disembodiment. His later work notwithstanding, the body remains a mere object in the 
intentional constituting act of consciousness. Since the mental acts of an ‘I think’ (i.e., 
specifically, of the transcendental ego/cogito) guide and unify human directedness, the body 
remains an awkward thing—neither an object fully extended nor part of the interpreting activity 
of the subject. 
As we can see, Husserl’s phenomenological edifice is built, at its foundation, with key 
structural problems and riddled by phenomena it cannot adequately capture. While it can account 
for a (re)presentational intentionality, it fails to elucidate on the deeper, holistic and more 
concrete nuances of our ongoing experiences. These are, indeed, more pervasive and far 
outweigh the instances where an enduring-presence subtends subject-to-object directedness—as 
the product of mental acts of consciousness. Moreover, Husserl’s transcendental attempt to get at 
the conditions of our experience of objects seems to have been prescribed by the very construct 
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that he granted from the start, the cogito, and the dualism it in which it famously inheres. It is not 
difficult to see how the limitations in his theory stem from having begun from this Cartesian ‘I 
think’—ultimately Husserl seems only to re-paint the picture of a disembodied and over-
determined subject around mere meaningless things. 
Now let us turn to Heidegger’s work, particularly, the existential analytic of Dasein (or 
Being and Time), to understand how an alternative conception of what it means to be the being 
that we are can be framed and, consequently, how we can displace and decenter this seemingly 
obvious understanding of ourselves as inner self/contained subjects from these previous claims. 
Additionally, we will look into Merleau-Ponty’s work to this end and in a way that is 
complementary to Heidegger’s project. By undermining the logical space of the subject, 
exemplified in Husserl’s work here, and considering this alternative view, we can then redirect 







AN ALTERNATIVE:  HEIDEGGER AND THE EXISTENTIALITY OF 
DASEIN 
Heidegger’s project begins with a return to ontology. Since he did not begin from a well 
established theoretical ground or a concept, an overview of his Seinsfrage will hereby provide us 
with a contrast in approach, vis-à-vis Husserl’s transcendental turn to the subject, and inform us 
as to the basic assumptions he makes to its formulation.
40
 What is being?
41
 Heidegger’s 
contention in his existential analytic is that the tradition has long mistreated this question as 
merely a question of ‘beings,’ of ‘entities,’ that is, of ‘things that are.’ This approach dates back 
to the pre-Socratics—in its highest consequence to Parmenides and the Eleatics—but becomes 
most thoroughly articulated—indeed, later by tradition re-appropriated and re-framed—in 
Aristotle who maintained that ‘to be’ is (ultimately) to be a substance (oὐσία).42 The father of 
logic appealed to language in elucidating ‘being’ as that which ‘stands under’ predicates and 
properties, is self-sufficient but also (categorically) manifold in its presence.
43
 This dominant 
                                                            
40 Heidegger famously raised this “question of being” in the introduction of Being and Time (2). 
41 Note that I don’t capitalize ‘being’ because ‘being’ is nothing like some ultimate “substance” (e.g., Plato’s the Good or the 
Christian God). This term is often found in uppercase in translations of Being and Time due to either a misunderstanding from the 
interpreter and translator or oversight of the fact that in German all such nouns are capitalized.  
42 We can perhaps find the best expositions in his Metaphysics (Books IV and V) and Categories. Being, Aristotle maintains, “is 
spoken . . . in its own right” but “in many ways [and] always with reference to one thing [or principle]” (1017a7, 1003a34). That 
which is ‘being,’ we can then gather, has a kind of independence, in that it is an ‘in-itself,’ but it also is always signifying a one 
thing. This to which being refers is what Aristotle calls substance (oὐσία). Accordingly, ‘beings’ are so called because they are 
substances, or said of substances, or lead to substances, or deny substances, etc. (1003b5-10). Thus, ‘being’ is in many ways but 
to be is, invariably, to be a substance. In Categories, Aristotle further narrows down the manifold meanings of being to ten. 
Substance, most importantly, designates an ‘enduring, present thing’ and is itself divided into a primary mode—the instance of a 
this “neither said of nor in any subject”—and secondary mode—a sort of a this in which primary substance belongs; primary 
substance, nonetheless, is substance “most fully” (2a12-16). All other ways of being are either properties inhering in substance or 
existing only in relation to substance, i.e., they have quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, possession, action, affection 
(1b25-2a5). Of course, this is further to say that nothing could exist without (primary) substance (2b5). Aristotle, Introductory 
Readings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1996). 
43 Aristotle also had linguistics in mind making for these claims for, if, indeed, there were nothing standing under (sub-stantia) 
predicates and properties, nothing to underlie the signifier, ever constant and present, what could logically ‘be’? The answer is 




ontology has become known in the Heideggerean literature as “substance ontology.”44 As 
Charles Guignon states: 
This outlook is what Dorothea Frede calls the “substance ontology”: the view that 
what’s ultimately real is that which underlies properties – what “stands under” 
(sub-stantia) and remains continuously present throughout change. Because of its 
emphasis on enduring presence, this traditional ontology is also called the 
“metaphysics of presence.” It is found . . . in Plato’s notion of the Forms, 
Aristotle’s primary substances, the Creator of Christian belief, Descartes res 




Being, for Heidegger, is rather “that which determines entities as entities, that on the 
basis of which entities are already understood.”46 An investigation into the meaning of being 
requires an ontological questioning of that which designates beings as mere entities (or 
occurents), since (a way of) being is always already manifested in them such that they ‘are’. 
Being is therefore not to be confused with ‘a’ being.47 The forgetfulness of this question, 
Heidegger suggests, is a testament to the historical emptiness of the concept of being.
48
 A 
‘fundamental ontology’ is necessary if one is then to make sense of what it means to ‘be’ at all.  
This undertaking is possible only through more careful consideration for phenomena as a 
whole.  “Phenomena are never appearances,” Heidegger argues, but “on the other hand every 
appearance is dependent on the phenomena.”49 After more careful analysis of the Greek, he 
explains that a phenomenon (φαινόμενoν) is “that which shows itself in itself” and an appearance 
                                                            
44 This is Dorothea Frege’s coinage. 
45 Charles Guignon, “Introduction,” The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 4. 
46 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 25, 26. 
47 This is commonly known as Heidegger’s ontological difference. 
48 Ibid., 43. 
49 Ibid., 53. 
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is a hiding of itself in that it covers up its origin (in another) and is not.
50
 So an appearance is 
dependent on the phenomena and, even in its covering up, can lead to the phenomena but is not 
the phenomena itself. The logos (λόγος) is intimately related to the phenomenon (φαινόμενoν) in 
that it signifies a “letting be seen” so that logos of the phenomenon (i.e., phenomenology) is a 
letting “that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from 
itself.”51 
Being, in as far as it is so defined, is about the ‘intelligibility’ or ‘access’ already given to 
the things (or substances) of experience and  it qualifies phenomena such that we are always also 
its own manifestation. As Heidegger puts it:  “Everything we talk about, everything we have in 
view, everything towards which we comport ourselves in any way, is being; what we are is 
being, and so is how we are.”52 Because of this, he cannot partake in any bracketing of our 
meaningful experiences of the world and thus departs with Husserl and his method in the 
phenomenological reduction.
53
 As a consequence, an ‘understanding of being’ is always already 
manifested in our basic comportment towards ‘beings’ (or objects), before any conceptualization 
or ontology (i.e., pre-ontologically): 
We are able to grasp beings as such, as beings, only if we understand something 
like being. If we did not understand, even though at first roughly and without 
conceptual comprehension, what actuality signifies, then the actual world would 
remain hidden from us. If we did not understand what reality means, then the real 
would remain inaccessible . . . We must understand being so that we may be able 
to be given over to a world that is.
54
 
                                                            
50 See Heidegger, Being and Time, 51-53. 
51 Ibid., 56-58. 
52 Ibid., 26. 
53 Certainly, to undertake in such bracketing would be to do violence to the phenomena and what it already lets be seen. 
54 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 10, 11. 
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In order to elucidate being thus, Heidegger first invites us to consider ourselves in our 
most average, commonplace engagement as expressed in day-to-day comportment (amidst all 
sorts of ‘things’ and with one another). Therein, in the texture of the everyday, we don’t usually 
find one another as commandeering subjects/egos standing over mere objects (to be apprehended 
or cognized) but rather we're “always already dwelling with the extant.”55 Being there (da-sein) 
we already understand. This disclosing activity is so basic that it doesn’t even require any such 
autonomous, inner beholding or (re)presencing characteristic of the cogito—of which inner 
conscious acts constitute subject to object directedness.
56
 A reflective turn inwards to a self-
sufficient intentional content (of the subject and its immanent sphere) only seems to conceal the 
character of the being that we are:  the being-there or Dasein.
 
 
This misinterpretation lies in an erroneous subjectivizing of intentionality . . . 
intentionality must not be interpreted on the basis of an arbitrary concept of the 
subject and ego and subjective sphere and thus taken for an absurd problem of 
transcendence . . . Because the usual separation between a subject with its 
immanent sphere and an object with its transcendent sphere—because, in general, 
the distinction between an inner and an outer is constructive and continually gives 
occasion for further constructions, we shall in the future no longer speak of a 
subject, of a subjective sphere, but shall understand the being to whom intentional 
comportments belong as Dasein.
57
 
 One could say that we are already pulled from without, heteronomously, by the very 
things and situations whose meanings already call us to and fro, before any subjective 
apprehension. Merleau-Ponty best captures the subversive significance of this idea towards the 
end of Phenomenology of Perception by stating that “[nothing] determines me from outside, not 
because nothing acts upon me, but, on the contrary, because I am from the start outside myself 
                                                            
55 Ibid., 64. 
56 This is, more radically, to say that there doesn’t necessarily have to be an object for an I-think. As we will see, being must 




and open to the world.”58 Indeed, this statement undercuts the very ‘problem’ that transcendence 
becomes.
59
 While such qualification may still appear to work within the constructive dichotomy 
that is problematic in the first place (i.e., that there is such categorical separation between us and 
the world, between the subject and object), Merleau-Ponty’s conclusion has powerful de-
constructive value in that it dismantles its logical space by literally turning its inside assumptions 
out.  
Dasein’s everyday comportment, more importantly, is anything but blind; it articulates 
just this understanding (of being) that precedes entities as entities (or objects as objects). Let us 
return to the phenomena so that we may see the alternative way of being Heidegger proposes 
here—the way of being of things that we encounter daily, which Heidegger calls “Zeug” or 
“equipment” (loosely translated), not in the manifestation of ‘mental acts’ but rather in the 
expression of practical activity:  the ready-to-hand or zuhandenheit.
60
  
A pencil, as we normally would grasp it, is (for the most part) so withdrawn as a mere 
object that we don’t have to cognize it as such to make sense of it. Instead, we aim through it ‘in-
order-to’ write here, because it already affords writing.61 While we can observe it as a mere 
thing, we normally put it to use without objectifying its essence or status as a pencil (or thing). 
That it is an elongated object with a certain solidity, weight and color is not how it shows itself to 
us first and foremost in engaged experience; instead, we understand it in an activity of writing as 
bearing on other things (such as paper, books, sharpeners, etc.) through practices/skills (like 
                                                            
58 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 530. 
59 Rather, the problem that it has always been in the tradition. 
60 See Heidegger, Being and Time, 97-98. 
61 Here the term ‘affordance’ is used exactly in the Gibsonian and ecological sense. Fortunately, we have coined more language 
with which to better point to this phenomenon. 
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handwriting, calligraphy, and so on) and for a goal in my use of it. We don’t grasp the pencil 
without already possessing this background understanding of its relation (or lack thereof) to 
other things and how it bears to a task at hand and our purposes. To say that we understand the 
pencil is in this case to engage with it in activity of using it as such.
62
 This ubiquitous 
phenomenon, our ongoing comportment with ‘equipment’ (and, truly, of anything that we ‘use’), 
is commonly referred to as ‘transparent coping’ because the object itself ‘withdraws’ and is not 
normally an entity of conscious apprehension.
63
  
If we are to consider a hammer, to take a classic example, under the traditional substance 
ontology, we see that it is essentially an object made out of two conjoined pieces:  a firm and 
elongated shaft and a heavier but also hardened blob. It has a certain weight, proportionality, 
density, et cetera, but it is primarily ‘this’ hammer and secondarily ‘a hammer’ with properties 
and corresponding predicates—further yet, with material or final causes such as being made out 
of ‘wood’ and ‘iron’ and for the use of craftsmanship. But, again, what such approach 
completely overlooks is that the hammer couldn’t be the thing that it is if it wasn’t already in a 
holism of other equipmental things (i.e., nails, wood, houses, etc.) that bear on its being and 
because of the work to be produced through it. Indeed, “to the being of any equipment there 
always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be the equipment that it is” and “the work 
bears with it that that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered.” 64 These 
underlying relational features cannot just be added to the object as properties, nor are they 
                                                            
62 Heidegger thus re-appropriates the term of ‘understanding’ not as a mental phenomenon (i.e., of cognition or representation of 
an object or state of affairs) but as practical and ongoing activity (grounded in an understanding of being). 
63 See Heidegger, Being and Time, 99.  Specifically, he notes that “the peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in 
its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw . . . in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically.” (Transparent coping is 
Hubert Dreyfus’ perfect coinage.) 
64 Ibid., 97, 99. 
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somehow imposed from a subjective sphere, but they already constitute the hammer such that it 
‘is’ from the start. 
Moreover, without an underlying significance of involvements, what Heidegger calls an 
“in-order-to,” “towards-which” and “for–the-sake-of-which,” belonging to the hammer, in the 
ready-to-hand and that grant us its intelligibility as such—of our human practices and 
priorities—this entity could not be the entity that it is. In this heavily nuanced and textured way, 
the hammer is a hammer in so far as it already exists within a whole of things that bear on its 
being and relates to ways in which we make sense of who we are (as Dasein) in the hammering 
itself.
65
 This primordial relationship we have with the things we use reflects a directedness that is 
more fundamental than what Husserl could account for in subject-to-object (or traditional) 
transcendence:  a primordial intentionality. It is captured by the closeness we, as the being-there, 
have to the ready-to-hand and expressed in the everyday of our thus “being-in-the-world.” 
Heidegger summarizes this best as follows: 
The theme of our analytic is to be being-in-the-world, and accordingly the very 
world itself; and these are to be considered within the horizon of average 
everydayness—the kind of being which is closest to Dasein . . . The being of 
those entities which we encounter as closest to us can be exhibited 
phenomenologically if we take as our clue . . . our [comportment] in the world 
and with entities within-the-world. The kind of [comportment] which is closest to 
us is as we have shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of 
concern which manipulates things and puts them to use; and this has its own kind 
of ‘knowledge.’66 
From this phenomenological consideration—not of an observer merely ‘staring’ at things 
(passively) but of everyday people engaged in an ongoing worldly activity—we can then see that 
                                                            
65 See Heidegger, Being and Time, 120. 
66 Ibid., 94-95. 
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our most basic involvement in the world is neither cognitive nor explicit according to Heidegger. 
In the manifestation of an ‘understanding of being’, it is first practical, withdrawn and highly 
nuanced. Assuming a reflective attitude towards the things of experience, as Husserl had (quite 
remarkably) done, brings ‘thinghood’ and ‘presence’ to center-focus into what Heidegger calls 




Turning traditional assumptions inside out, Heidegger further proposes the ontological 
foundation of this (re)presencing, the present-at-hand, in the ready-to-hand as exemplifying the 
tacit and ubiquitous ‘know-how’ for our already making ourselves intelligible before any such 
(re)presentation.
68
 The present-at-hand is thus a ‘break-down’ mode of our common experience; 
it is derivative from the more basic, holistic and pervasive ready-to-hand way of being expressed 
in daily comportment. Additionally, these ways of being ontologically disclose entities (i.e., they 
allow things to ‘show up’ for us) differently as ways of intelligibility. 
The significance in which equipment shows up, revealed in a ‘totality of involvements’, 
is intrinsically connected to Dasein and its way of being for Heidegger such that: 
[It] goes back ultimately to a “towards-which” in which there is no further 
involvement . . . This primary “towards-which” . . . is a “for-the-sake-of-which”. 
But the ‘for-the-sake-of’ always pertains to the being of Dasein, for which, in its 
being, that very being is essentially an issue . . . Dasein comports itself towards its 
being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it ‘has’ 
this possibility, but not as a property . . . And because Dasein is in each case 
                                                            
67 See ibid., 79. 
68 Heidegger, specifically, qualifies that “to lay bare what is just present-at-hand and no more, cognition must first penetrate 
beyond what is ready-to-hand in our concern.” See Heidegger, Being and Time, 101. 
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essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very being, ‘choose’ itself and win 
itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself.
69
 
 Therefore we also see that Dasein’s involvements ultimately reflect its ability to 
choose and express its understanding of being because it possesses this as its “ownmost 
possibility.”70 These latter points lead into Heidegger’s more ‘existential’ ideas which, 
for the purposes of this paper, we will not explore.
71
 The focus here, as it has been, is on 
the ontology and the conditions that make Dasein’s existence possible in uncovering its 
relationship to the world:  its existentiality. Our discussion has been framed with 
particular relevance to Husserl’s project and the assumptions that guide it in formulating 
our intentionality to the world. But what is the being of Dasein? And how are we to 
understand its temporality? These are still relevant questions so we will look ahead with 
such considerations in mind. 
Finally, Heidegger proposes the way of being of Dasein as ‘care’; that its essence 
“lies in its existence.”72 Here it must be noted that care is not meant as some 
psychological construct or private/subjective phenomenon. Care must rather be 
understood ontologically, as the condition for Dasein’s projection towards entities (in 
concern) and with others (in solicitude) being-in-the-world.
73
 Because of its way of being 
as ‘care’, Dasein puts things to use to express its ownmost potentiality to be that which it 
                                                            
69 Ibid., 116-117, 68. The “is an issue” should, of course, not be taken to mean something mental or subjective but rather, in our 
being-there, it captures what is expressed in the significance of involvements, phenomenologically (i.e., in our concrete 
everydayness) and, ontologically, in our way of being. 
70 This is the more explicit sense in which it is “an issue”: that it has a choice.  
71 Some of these topics include ‘being-with,’ ‘authenticity,’ ‘the one’ (or ‘das man’) and death. Of course, it is well known that 
Heidegger also rejected the term ‘existentialist’ about his work. 
72 Ibid., 329, 67. 
73 See Heidegger, Being and Time, 237-238. Heidegger emphasizes that “care . . . lies ‘before’ every factical ‘attitude’ and 
‘situation’ of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means that it always lies in them.” 
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is—both generally, as ‘being-there’, and specifically, as ‘this’ being-there. This 
potentiality that is owned by Dasein, furthermore, indicates that Dasein is always 
“already ahead of itself” in its projecting.74 Of course, if we consider Dasein’s 
understanding, the primordial directedness in which we find ourselves engaged in the 
ready-to-hand, we see that “[understanding] means to be projecting towards a 
potentiality-for-being for the sake of which any Dasein exists.”75 Here it is important for 
us to return to the phenomena once again in order to see exactly what Heidegger is 
pointing out ontologically. 
I use this pencil and ‘understand’ it through this activity of writing here, on this 
piece of paper, ‘with’ other equipment (such as the eraser next to the paper and the pencil 
sharpener), because I would like to put down these ideas I have about certain concepts so 
that they will be physically recorded, ‘towards’ the completion of a work in philosophy 
and ‘in-order-to’ establish my case and that I may be evaluated on philosophical 
reasoning and aptitude, ‘for-the-sake-of’ my understanding of myself as a student of 
philosophy in this university and my interests in certain topics, as part of a larger society 
that values and prioritizes such academic activities. The pencil (and every object bearing 
on it) is integral to my understanding of myself as a student, in the practice of writing, 
and for the goals and priorities I have as part of a community to produce works with it. 
Consequently, I am constantly projecting myself in the manipulation of it, to the 
production of a work that expresses this understanding of myself, for my sake, and in so 
                                                            
74 Ibid., 236. 
75 Ibid., 385. 
35 
 
doing I make myself sensible such that I am:  ‘this’ student, in this community, in this 
situation, etc. 
We can see that Dasein’s temporality is thus essentially futural; it is rooted in its 
way of being as care and because of its existence. In contrast to Husserl successive 
temporalization of empty but real ‘nows’ in consciousness (that an entity must somehow 
interpret to bestow meaning), time for Dasein is always pregnant with meaning and 
guided by an activity, in our concern, projecting towards possibilities from an 
understanding of being.
76
 While it can become a ‘now’ of apprehension or a present-at-
hand entity to be discerned, it is only so derivatively and from the horizon against which 
Dasein makes itself intelligible in care. 
But how else is Dasein projected in understanding if not through the body (that is, 
in the body-writing, body-hammering)? It is well known that Heidegger never mentions 
the body; but to say that he brackets the body or that he is still liable to the charge of 
disembodiment is to completely misunderstand the ontology of the existential analytic 
that we have attempted to clarify hitherto. The fact that he doesn’t explore the role of the 
body does not necessarily mean that his theory precludes it as a central possibility. 
Rather, if we consider our exposition of Heidegger up to this point we see that there 
really is no other way Dasein could be but with-a-body. It is here that my reading of 
                                                            
76 It is important here to refer to Zahavi’s arguments against the view that Husserl ascribes to a metaphysics of presence. In his 
perceptive reading of Husserl’s work, Zahavi argues that “Husserl always emphasizes the transcendence of the perceived object . 
. . [Husserl] is not merely arguing that every perception of an object must necessarily include more than that which is intuitively 
present . . . Ultimately, Husserl is also claiming that the intuitively given profile is only presenting the object because of its 
horizonal reference to the absent profiles of the object.” This ‘horizonal intentionality’ is indeed quite prominent in Husserl’s 
later work, as referenced by Zahavi. See Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology, 95-98. 
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Merleau-Ponty is complementary to Heidegger’s project (without a conflation of their 
theories) in elucidating this primordial intentionality. The clue I take to this exposition 
lies first in their likeminded appropriation of the term ‘understanding’ that, as we have 
seen, dismantles the traditional conception of a mental process. 
The Body Again – Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of Body Schema 
In the previous chapter, we introduced Merleau-Ponty’s work on the body and his 
account of motor intentionality against Husserl’s view. Particularly noteworthy is that Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of body-understanding, like Dasein’s understanding, reflects our involvements 
more directly in an on-going activity. This understanding, in both cases, does not primordially 
belong to the realm of (re)presentation to consciousness, cognition or to any subject originated 
directedness (of an I-think).
77
 In Merleau-Ponty, this embodied understanding rather constitutes 
our ‘phenomenal field’ from the start and projects us in an “abiding space of perceptual 
possibilities, impossibilities and necessities”:  the ‘body schema’.78 Carman explains: 
The body schema is . . . precisely not an image of the body, for images are objects 
of awareness, whereas schemata sketch out in advance and hence structure our 
awareness of objects. [It] is our ability to anticipate and (literally) incorporate the 
world prior to applying concepts to objects. This ability, which Merleau-Ponty 
also calls “habit,” is not objective knowledge, nor is it internal to the mind, for “it 
is the body that ‘understands’ in the acquisition of habit.”79 
                                                            
77 See Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 160. Merleau-Ponty also says that “to move one’s body is to aim at things 
through it; it is to allow oneself to respond to their call, which is made independently of any representation.” This is not to deny 
the role of cognition and (re)presentation to embodiment but rather it is to say that they are normally derivative from a more 
pervasive body-world relationship. 
78 Taylor Carman, Merleau-Ponty (London: Routledge, 2008), 105. 
79 Ibid., 106. 
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The way in which the body is geared within its environment, in understanding, also 
points to the more basic intentionality Heidegger proposed by being grounded in the same 
phenomena, that is, in our ‘skillful coping.’80 Embodiment is therefore a critical part to our 
being-in-the-world, in so far as it allows us to express this understanding in the everyday. 
Merleau-Ponty further establishes this connection to Heidegger by relating the performance of 
the body to existence such that: 
The analysis of motor habit as an extension of existence leads… to an analysis of 
perceptual habit as the coming into possession of a world. Conversely, every 
perceptual habit is still a motor habit and here equally the process of grasping a 
meaning is performed by the body.
81
 
The body schema is the feature that defines motor intentionality not only in how it 
allows objects to be utilized through our body but, more basically, in how it designates 
that they ‘show up’ as objects in a space of possibilities for action. Consequently, this 
space, our phenomenal field—which is not a mere bundle of sensory facts but the very 
‘transcendental field’ within which we are directed—is constituted by these body 
schematic processes nuancing the grasp we have of our world, at every turn, through any 
situation and in manifold ways.  
A martial artist, for example, acts in the space of possibilities designated by her 
body schema in the accurate execution of a spin kick to a target at a certain height, range 
and through a number of obstacles or she may reach precisely through her sword that, 
incorporated into her bodily space (the schema), slices and thrust across targets as if in 
                                                            
80 Hubert Dreyfus coined the term skillful coping in his lectures at U.C. Berkeley and throughout many publications. Prominently, 
see Hubert Dreyfus, Skillful Coping (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
81 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 176. 
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seamless extension of her arm. The parkour practitioner traverses across urban places that 
his body designates as ‘open’, in possibilities unique to his ability, by his effortlessly 
jumping through a fence demarcating the edge of higher ground to a lower level, landing 
and running seamlessly to escalate up vertical walls to the balcony of three storey 
building.  
Of course, we do not need to consider bodily skills of expert performers here. The 
space of possibilities that the body schema opens up is expressed just as well in my using 
this pencil to write this sentence, through very finely tuned movements that (re)create 
these pre-designated shapes, with this hand and by the specific grasp of my hand and 
fingers. In an ongoing activity, the pencil (just like the sword) withdraws as it is literally 
incorporated in-order-to produce and work. Additionally, I can go up a stairwell, move 
through a crowd, open doors and grab my drink while running towards a classroom by 
virtue of this bodily space of possibilities that has been opened up before me, without 
ever having to cognize each object that was part of the experience. In all its limitations, 
necessities and possibilities it is this body schema that thus allows us to be in the ongoing 
grasp of our world understandingly. As Carman summarizes, it “constitutes our 
precognitive familiarity with ourselves and the world we inhabit [because] ‘I am aware of 
my body via the world’ . . . just as ‘I am aware of the world through the medium of my 
body’.”82  
                                                            
82 Carman, Merleau-Ponty, 106, 107. 
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By this exposition, Merleau-Ponty’s account of motor intentionality complements 
Heidegger’s primordial intentionality quite explicitly. His closeness to Husserl is made 
all the more tenuous when we consider it at just this fundamental level. Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty point to the phenomenon of everydayness and argue against the tradition 
and Husserl’s continuation of its prejudices that categorically separate us from the world. 
It is particularly important here, at this juncture, to then ascertain what ‘world’ means 
since, as it should now be clear, the world cannot be a collection of mere ‘things’ (or, 
indeed, any-thing itself) nor is it an intended object of consciousness as Husserl posits 
it.
83
 Rather, it is in our ‘familiarity’ with the world that we have the closest glimpse of its 
phenomenon as an originary ontological structure. 
The World and Our Primordial Relationship Being-in-the-world 
To better bring into view this which has been ignored, dismissed or mistreated in terms of 
subjectivity, let us then return to Heidegger’s ontological investigation and the relational totality 
that discloses entities as equipment (or manipulanda), in the ready-to-hand, so that we may 
conceptualize what is meant by ‘world.’ 84 As we have clarified thus far, the beholding of an 
object presupposes a holistic grasp of it as first and foremost bearing on other things.
85
 It is in 
this basic practical mode that we are always already given to our world understandingly. What 
else does this overarching relational totality of things as equipmental show us? To review, 
Heidegger explains that things given in this practical structure are made whole by their being tied 
                                                            
83 As we’ve seen in the first chapter here, Husserl quite explicitly claims that “the world itself is the object intended.” See 
Husserl, Logical Investigations, Investigation V, §14, 568. 
84 “Manipulanda” is Merleau-Ponty’s term commonly used in Phenomenology of Perception. 
85 This is also the case for naturally occurring ‘things’ such as water, rocks and air as resources. 
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to significance (i.e., they have an in-order-to, a towards-which, a with-which and a for-the-sake-
of-which) and that is part of Dasein’s projecting (futurally) as care. This, we have also 
established, need not be mental or conscious; rather, through primordial/motor intentionality, the 
signifying is already made manifest in an activity as we enact our understanding of being. 
Indeed, everywhere we turn and in whatever we do we are always using things in such a way that 
we express our understanding of them within a given referential totality and through 
significance, in concern (with equipment) and solicitude (with others), without necessarily 
cognizing them or (re)presenting their possibilities within us. They are given in the space of 
actively grasping them that already makes sense from the possibilities laid ahead by our body-
understanding (the schema). It is this ‘background,’ on the basis of which we project (care), 
which points us to the world, the world that we’ve granted from the outset in our ontological 
exposition and that we can bring it into better view here with the following passage from Being 
and Time: 
That wherein Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself 
is that [on the basis of which] it has let entities be encountered beforehand. The 
“wherein” of an activity of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that [on 
the basis of which] one lets entities be encountered in the kind of being that 
belongs to involvements; and this “wherein” is the phenomenon of the world. And 
the structure of that [on the basis of which] Dasein assigns itself is what makes up 
the worldhood of the world.
86
 
This phenomenon that points to the world as an ontological structure, also constitutive of 
Dasein, is ‘familiarity’ and this, in turn, always refers to the “wherein” within which Dasein exist 
as the world.
87
 It is the background on the basis of which any and all understanding takes its 
                                                            




meaning, in Dasein’s projection (care), and from which any objects arise as objects, in any way 
of being ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. As such, the ‘worldhood of the world’ is also part of 
our being-in-the-world in the way Dasein exists and expresses an understanding of being.
88
 We 
can categorize this existentially in that we always have a ‘perspective’ on the world such that 
“the surrounding world is different in a certain way for each of us” but, at the same time, “we 
move about in a common world.”89 The world is the pregnant source from which the ‘being-
there’ always takes its meaning in any mode of understanding (or presencing) but also ultimately 
in that it ‘exists’. 
A closing look at the phenomenon of familiarity as it relates to the referential totality is 
useful here to grasp how ‘world’ prescribes experience more commonly, in an instance of 
encountering. Here Heidegger offers the best explanation by considering our experience of a 
room: 
The manifold of things encountered here is not an arbitrary manifold of incidental 
things; it is first and only present in a particular correlation of references . . . a 
closed totality . . . My encounter with a room is not such that I first take in one 
thing after another and put together a manifold of things in order then to see a 
room. Rather, I primarily see a referential totality as closed, from which the 
individual piece of furniture and what is in the room stand out . . . The closed 
character of the referential whole is grounded precisely in familiarity, and this 
familiarity implies that the referential relations are well-known. Everyday concern 




In familiarity we therefore finally capture the essence of this relationship we have to the 
world; an ontological relation that, even in its mode of breakdown, is never fundamentally one of 
                                                            
88 See ibid., 92, 93. 
89 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 164. 
90 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 187. 
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separation or inner to outer directedness.
91
 It is one in which we always already belong and 
because of which there can be any transcendence or intentionality at all. Ultimately, the world is 
not a ‘thing.’ It is the condition for our encountering any-thing that reveals (i.e., discloses) 











                                                            
91 We did not explore the mode of breakdown here but only hinted at it here. It begins in what Heidegger calls the ‘unready-to-
hand’ and has an ontological relationship to the present-at-hand. 
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DECENTERING THE SUBJECT IN CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE 
This discussion should prove more than sufficient to invite us out of the comfort of the 
subject and its distance to the world. As is now clear, Husserl’s conceptual framework cannot 
clarify our most basic understanding expressed in the daily know-how of transparent/skillful 
coping and the body’s own focal role given to this significance (etre au monde) in its habitual 
dealings. The cogito lags behind and is crippled by self-centeredness. We must be reminded that 
this is not to deny the place of consciousness, at the very least, in the phenomenon of 
(re)presentation and cognition. This ability to bring ‘thinghood’ to presence is integral to the 
being that we are and our comportment by making the so-called ‘first person’ point of view 
possible. But, while we often can and do encounter entities as mere entities, this is not at all what 
is ontologically primordial and phenomenologically basic to our experience. An unassuming turn 
to the phenomena, taking it as it shows itself from itself, reveals this much without having to 
retroactively conjure ghastly abstract entities in the fumbling of transcendental reduction. More 
strikingly, the irreducibility of this know-how attests to the absurdity of any cognitivist ambitions 
to construe us and our world in terms of logical syntactic processes and entities—of which one 
only has to ascertain the correct predicative and causal stories—without comprehending the vast 
inter-relatedness to which we are always already given in an embodied and situated activity, with 
care as our ontological determination, and from which the very possibility of us as selves or self-
contained minds originates. Philosophical discourse must thus return to this ground and sprout 
from it anew by re-establishing our relationship to the world—our ownership and, more 
importantly, our responsibility within it. 
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To this task, generally, it is clear that we must see through pernicious dichotomies of self 
and world, subject and object, inner and outer that sever us from the world at this fundamental 
level. We must, as we have been doing through this paper, deconstruct them by undermining the 
logical space within which they rise as sensible possibilities and employing disclosive 
arguments. Indeed, our unitary relationship with the world needs to be re-stated this way so that 
we may form new metaphors and guide the discussion from more wholesome assumptions and 
towards new theories. Heidegger offers a clear alternative, as we have formulated it here, by 
considering the primordial togetherness in which world and ‘being-there’ (Dasein) are 
interdefined. These productive dichotomies of philosophy then dissolve and cease to produce 
their work in the heritage of an ancient ontology.
92
 
World exists—that is, it is—only if [being-there] exists, only if there is [being-
there]. Only if world is there, if [being-there] exists as being-in-the-world, is there 
understanding of being, and only if this understanding exists are intra-worldly 
beings unveiled as [present] and [useful]. World-understanding as [being-there]-
understanding is self-understanding. Self and world belong together in the single 
entity, the [being-there]. Self and world are not two beings, like subject and 
object, or like I and thou, but self and world are the basic determination of the 
[being-there] itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-world.
93
 
As a consequence, we can see that the problem of transcendence is no longer a ‘problem’ 
that somehow needs ‘solving’. Our directedness to the world is not something that belongs to the 
immanent sphere of a subject in relation to an object, nor is it captured by such a distinction in 
the first place; rather, Heidegger explains, “the intentional constitution of the Dasein’s 
comportments is precisely the ontological condition of the possibility of every and any 
                                                            
92 Under these distinctions, after all, one can ostensibly doubt the existence of the ‘external’ world and remain sensible—a ruse 
no child will believe. 
93 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 297. 
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transcendence.”94 Indeed, there is no such ‘problematic’ for how we reach across a ‘void’ of 
meaning, from an overdetermined ‘within’ to an empty world ‘out there’, because we’ve 
destroyed the logical space within which the very question of subject-to-object transcendence 
works.
95
 Its terms of an ‘either/or’ have been dis-solved. Husserl’s task to bridge this categorical 
divide, through his transcendental phenomenology, becomes now all the more clear to us in its 
limitations by the narrow and misleading experience it outlines for our way of being (i.e., 
transcendental presence). We can see his philosophical project as symptomatic of both a 
substance ontology and the cogito from which the subject and ego take their rise. This is a 
paradigm that Husserl could not escape and, again, it is exactly in this sense that his theory of 
intentionality remains traditional. 
In order to redirect discourse we must then, more specifically, subvert the logic of this 
ontology (metaphysics of presence) and the language within which it works to produce its 
prejudices. Let us return to the claims we laid out in the first chapter and consider them, now in a 
new light, to this initiative and so as to re-frame our understanding and familiarity being-in-the-
world as originary ontological structures to this task. At the same time, we must keep in mind 
that the phenomenon of presence Husserl was trying to articulate is indeed very much part of our 
human experience but the contention here is that it is not what is most basic. In our most 
common and practical engagements, once again, we don’t find ourselves as subjects standing 
over mere objects with a bridge of relevance and meaning to cross. We find ourselves first 
already within them by virtue of these unitary phenomena. 
                                                            
94 Ibid, 65. 
95 We’ve done this through dissolution of the dialectic that allows its work. 
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Against the Subject: Final Claims in Light of Heidegger’s Existential Analytic 
First, I have asserted that Husserl’s hyle and noetic schema are neither self-sufficient nor 
necessary to the intentional object apprehension. The logic behind these constructs assumes that 
the access we have to world must be made possible by some inner feature of the subject, through 
a mental act, that apprehends the raw data of experience to constitute its intentional object. In par 
with the paradigm of the cogito, here it is also granted that an ‘I-think’ generates and gives 
meaning in subject-to-object directedness. This is problematic from two different angles. First, 
Husserl grants that subject and object are two categorically separate entities that have a 
relationship only through the former’s inner intentional structure. Likewise, he assumes this 
intentional structure takes hold of the world only through the mental acts of consciousness 
immanent to the subject. My stronger claim here is that this intentional relationship the noetic 
schema and hyle attempt to construe is not one that belongs to an inner mental act (of the subject) 
but, rather, is first already constituted by the body schema (of the ‘being-there’) in its possession 
of a familiar world and through common action as a unitary-disclosive phenomenon and from 
which there can be any such object apprehension. The space of possibilities within which our 
body works (e.g., via perception, in proprioception and through environmental affordances) pre-
designates what may come to presence in an already intentional activity and is primordially 
determined by our skillful coping and the stance we take towards such activity.  
Take, for example, that experience of a busy college day for a student as she heads to 
class. She rushes to her calculus test site and her ability to cross streets, move through busy 
hallways, open doors, climb stairs, grasping and coming into contact with many objects, 
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situations and other people, while beholding the fundamental theorem of calculus as object of 
apprehension, makes it possible for this ongoing activity to remain intentional without 
(re)presenting each and every particular instance of encountering (myriad of objects and people) 
to this end. Ultimately, she traverses this extremely nuanced space in-order-to go to class; but 
this is not a possibility that she needs to represent either—it guides her activity quite thematically 
in her projection as ‘this’ student. If she were a philosophy major, she might perhaps begin 
thinking about phenomenology and, in a very Husserlian fashion, stare at an object while 
reflecting on her ability to be directed towards it, (re)presentationally, but this is only a stance 
that she has decided to take towards her experience that is in no way required for embodied 
intentional comportment.
96
 It is in no way representative of her normal experience. More 
explicitly, if she had sustained an ankle injury and lost proprioceptive ability to her foot, the 
flight of stairs (and her foot) might then suddenly stand out to her, every step of the way, as a 
distinct object(s) with clear physical properties to be discerned. She is forced to suspend the 
transparency of her common interaction in-the-world because of these task-specific limitations 
that her body has assigned her. 
Second, I have contended that the now appears a dubious source of presence in the 
temporal constitution of meaning. Because the content of primal impression cannot depend 
exclusively on the apprehension of the noetic schema, since presence is given to us in 
‘difference’, any such temporal constitution must already be informed by the retentive character 
of what ‘just’ was and has been to its own self-relation. More radically, the meaningful 
constitution of the now must also be made sensible in this quality of difference within a space 
                                                            
96 This, in other words, is to say that action can be purposive without an agent entertaining a purpose. 
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that there may be any difference at all and from which there is any sense for a ‘now’ to come into 
being in self-disclosure. My stronger claim to the temporality of meaningful experience is thus 
that the phenomenon of the now is sensible only first against a background condition of 
projecting (futurally) and subsequently to the folding-back of consciousness to itself (past) that 
temporally interprets it as within a pervasive horizon of care. The temporal cadence of our 
experiences impregnates each now to be both salient and relevant through these very ontological 
structures. 
The student rushing to her classroom sees each now as filled and constituted against the 
activity of going to class, in that instance, and to this activity, thematically, in her understanding 
as a student, to the concernful involvement with ‘this’ busy hallway, through ‘that’ door and to 
the significance of her taking the calculus test and articulating an understanding of applied 
concepts of mathematical derivation. They may stand out to her as distinct temporal moments 
but they are never isolated and without meaningful direction; rather, they press onwards as she 
enacts her ownmost possibilities in the rhythm of this disclosive activity and to its relevance. She 
might decidedly turn her attention towards these moments (as objects in themselves) and strip 
them of their worldly and existential character by taking a purely transcendental or scientific 
stance but, again, such moments are not accessible to her if not first within the conditions of 
intelligibility that already grant them to her from any perspective. She is able to behold an instant 
from a view because she is the kind of being that can project and self-refer temporally.  
Finally, I have maintained that the transcendental ego is a deficient explanation for the 
unity of our concrete experiences. The better alternative to the shortcomings of this model is 
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captured by a situated and embodied ‘being-there’ as we have unveiled it here—grounded in my 
complementary reading of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. At bottom, we can see that what it 
means to be the being that we are cannot be formulated in terms of subject to an object or any 
such ontological separation. I thus raise my final and more radical claim that we can understand 
ourselves as subjects (to objects) only derivatively and after we have suspended the relationship 
which already unites us in the phenomenon of worldhood in the ontological whole of being-in-
the-world. It is clear that the phenomenon Husserl was pointing to is very much part of our 
experience but we do not constitute our world and ourselves in terms of this directedness. The 
fact that we are fundamentally ‘enworlded’ is that which allows us to be directed towards and 
constitute any object in consciousness, against a background of many other related and un-
related things, for certain purposes and because of our way of being as care.   
As the student arrives to class, her attention is directed to certain physical objects and 
spaces such as the actual classroom, the desk she usually sits on, the board and the calculus book 
she carries with scribbled-on notes. She imagines many different manipulations of a given 
calculus problem (an abstract object) that she may be able to differentiate or integrate on her test 
(a physical object) because she would like to demonstrate her proficiency in the topic, pass the 
class and eventually be able to comprehend more complex relationships in the application to 
physical problems, from more nuanced objects and relationships, building her future as a 
mechanical engineer. That these are objects of (re)presentation to her is made possible by the fact 
that there is already an articulated world within which these objects make sense both particularly 
and generally. She is this student, in this society, with these priorities and she projects herself to 
becoming an engineer, at this university, as a woman of color, with these beliefs, from this 
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culture, etc. The world within which she ‘dwells’ is exactly that from which any-thing may come 
to presence, as a condition that she sees herself and that she projects forward in an activity of 
understanding that she ‘is’. 
Closing Remarks and Further Considerations 
These claims, both in the introductory case of the first chapter and in the more radical 
sense here, articulate my critique against the subject and its shallow directedness epitomized in 
Husserl’s theory of intentionality. More importantly, we have ventured beneath the assumptions 
of the subject-to-object model and, through Heidegger’s ontology, discussed the new ground 
from which to reformulate our way of being as first unitary and never hopelessly problematic in 
a question of transcendence. This exploration was grounded in the phenomenon of our common 
experience, considering Merleau-Ponty’s work in embodiment as complementary to the 
phenomenology. Broadly, the existential character of the being that we are, or, our existentiality, 
as I call it, guided us to the destruction of the prejudices that produce these terms in a categorical 
separation, epitomized in the intentionality of the subject. My interpretation of 
phenomenological texts to this general task provides more than sufficient support for the 
particular claims I raised apropos this traditional intentionality and to the purposes of inviting a 
more radical consideration of it. 
Even if we do not look into the existential implications of these claims, as that is well 
beyond my purposes in this paper, there are some relevant points we can lay out for further 
discussion. I would like to make some qualifications, particularly, in closing, to the positive way 
in which the destruction of these prejudices here informs our way of being in cultural self-
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understanding and with poignant relevance to our times. We can ask the following questions to 
this end: What would it mean for us to begin seeing ourselves as inseparable from our world? 
What would it then be like to see truly that this ‘enworlded’ ground we walk on is entirely ours, 
of our making, and that, as such, we are completely responsible and accountable in its unbridled 
proliferation? How can such a radical change in the way we see ourselves and our world affect 
our individual and cultural perspectives to ecological responsibility? 
I believe it to be clear that only with the fall of the subject as a cultural paradigm, with 
the erosion of its language and metaphors, will the comforting distance of a self-contained ‘I-
think’ to an object be displaced and thereby allow the emergence of a new and radical sense of 
belonging. Dasein is, after all, fundamentally de-distancing; but this is a relationship that we 
must constantly uncover and reframe towards making more explicit the responsibility that this 
ownership brings—at the individual, societal and cultural levels. Under this lens, notions of 
subject and object are thus no longer mere moot terms for arguments of armchair philosophers 
but entail pernicious reflections that enslave us to an illusory self-image and logic, distancing us 
from the world that we ourselves are and as we continue to act in its unrestrained expansion—
particularly so, by muddling our ecological relationship with it in an ontological and material 





We have here set out and finished on the general task of rethinking the intentionality of 
the subject through a more radical interpretation of its phenomenon and the question of 
transcendence it produces. A thorough but well-focused reading of Heidegger’s texts and 
complementary exposition of Merleau-Ponty’s work—along with important critiques from other 
key figures—informed us in this task, specifically, by allowing us to formulate a series of claims 
against the subject (and its narrow and specialized directedness) through world-disclosing 
arguments. We can now summarize and merge these central claims to three main thesis points I 
would like to establish. First, Husserl’s concepts of the hyle and noetic schema are neither self-
sufficient nor necessary to the intentional object apprehension because their intentional 
relationship is not one that belongs to an inner mental act (of the subject) but, rather, is first 
already constituted by the body schema (of the ‘being-there’) in its possession of a familiar 
world and through common action as a unitary-disclosive phenomenon, from which there can be 
any such transcendental apprehension. Second, the now (as primal impression) appears a dubious 
source of presence in the temporal constitution of meaning because its phenomenon is sensible 
only first against a background condition of temporal projecting (futurally) and subsequently to 
the folding-back of consciousness to itself (past) that temporally interprets it as within a 
pervasive horizon of care (that we are). Lastly, the transcendental ego is a deficient explanation 
for the unity of our concrete experiences because we can understand ourselves as subjects to 
objects only derivatively, after we have suspended the relationship which already unites us in the 
phenomenon of worldhood in the ontological whole of being-in-the-world. 
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As we have seen, transcendental presence in the Husserlian fashion thus exhibited is not 
what is most basic to our human experience and I related the overarching ontological discussion 
to original examples of the phenomena in an attempt to ground the abstract in the concrete. In the 
first chapter, I sketched the fundamental (albeit not comprehensive) picture of what the 
traditional view of intentionality entails and outlined its problems through some preliminary 
claims. The second chapter then consisted in directing the discussion to Heidegger’s 
revolutionary ontology, interpreting it and formulating arguments to the task of dismantling the 
basic assumptions on which Husserl’s project still works and so as to re-formulate ourselves and 
our primordial intentionality being-in-the-world. A discussion of the body was central to these 
chapters. Lastly, I presented stronger claims against the subject in the effort to capture the 
existentiality of Dasein as an alternative to Husserl’s model and towards a more integral view of 
human experience. 
An intentionality of the subject with its inner mental content, dependence upon primal 
impressions and a supervening ego thus fails to articulate the fundamental relationship we have 
with the world. It cannot deliver us to the heavily nuanced, concrete and embodied everyday in 
which we already project and understand ourselves. This failure, however, is not a shortcoming 
of its theoretical reach nor of its guiding phenomenon (i.e., transcendental presence), but reveals 
a fundamental limitation in its conceptual groundwork. Indeed, the subject, the indubitable 
cogito and its directedness, falls behind in the assumptions of an ancient ontology still binding us 
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